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INTERNET METADATA COLLECTION
Desperately Seeking Substance (Not Slogans) in Review Group Report on NSA
Surveillance
By Peter Margulies  Thursday, December 19, 2013, 3:00 PM
While the Report of the President’s Review Group (see Ritika’s post here and Ben’s here) has already generated classic Washington-style buzz
because of its criticism of the NSA’s bulk collection of metadata, the real embarrassment should be felt by the Review Group itself.  Its analysis of a
central point – whether bulk collection is an effective counterterrorism tool – is scandalously slender.  Moreover, the Report is awash in
unacknowledged contradictions that compromise its most far-reaching recommendations.  Critics of the bulk collection program will doubtless hail
the Report, especially as it follows on the heels of Judge Leon’s decision.  More dispassionate readers may view the shelf life of each as short.
In recommending the termination of the current program, the Report discounts the program’s effectiveness in a conclusory fashion.  Labeling the
program “not essential to preventing attacks,” the Review Group ½nds insuf½cient the government’s assertion that bulk collection supplied twelve
tips for further investigation in 2012 alone.  Apparently, twelve tips are too few.  However, this kind of numerical judgment is far too hasty.  Even
one tip is suf½cient, if it leads to useful information on terrorism.  Take the Zazi case, where government of½cials have testi½ed that the bulk
collection program helped in the timely identi½cation of co-conspirators in a plot to bomb New York’s subways.  That role should earn the program
some props.  However, while the Report mentions the Zazi case in its favorable comments on section 702 and foreign surveillance, the interaction of
215 and 702 receives little attention.  Indeed, the entire issue of effectiveness rates only one page in a 300-page opus.
Actually, the effectiveness issue gets even less than a page, because the Report takes up some of that space with claims about feasible alternatives to
bulk collection that don’t dovetail with its other ½ndings.  The Report claims that any useful information obtained through bulk collection “could
readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders” tailored to speci½c targets.  However, the Report’s subsequent
discussion casts doubt on its claims of timeliness.  Discussing an alternative it prefers – entrusting bulk collection to the private sector – the Review
Group concedes that this approach would be “less ef½cient” and could engender “problems in querying multiple, privately held data bases
simultaneously and expeditiously.”  Exactly so.  The Report’s preferred solution is a new private sector entity that would assume the collection
function now handled by the NSA.  However, the Report nowhere explains how this private sector entity would dodge the potential for abuse that
the Report fears.   
This omission is peculiar, because the lion’s share of the Report is about the potential for abuse, not the reality of steadily improving compliance. 
This concern with abuse often submerges vital information about checks currently in place, such as the FISC.  The Report admits that the FISC has
been a substantial check on the government, for example by engaging in an iterative process that reins in initial government requests before
granting them in modi½ed form.  The Report also acknowledges that the bulk collection program requires that analysts query metadata only with a
small number of identi½ers approved by responsible NSA of½cials as triggering “reasonable and articulable suspicion” (RAS) of links to terrorism. 
However, the Report then ½nds these safeguards inadequate, again without analysis.  Instead, the Report resorts to sloganeering, warning about the
chill to freedom of speech when “government is one ¾ick of a switch away” from massive amounts of metadata.  A more balanced report might have
conceded that compliance problems with bulk collection---such as the use of non-RAS-approved identi½ers---faded by late 2009 as the government
implemented new safeguards required by the FISC.  However, a focus on facts might have diminished the space available for slogans.
The problems with the Report’s most drastic recommendations should not obscure the merit in some of its proposals.  For example, more extensive
reporting to Congress is clearly vital (although a diligent legislator could obtain more than enough information pre-Snowden; see Ryan Lizza’s New
Yorker pro½le of persistent bulk collection critic, Oregon senator Ron Wyden, which Tim Edgar posted about last week).  Furthermore, the public
should now receive access to FISC decisions more regularly and comprehensively.  In addition, the FISC might bene½t from an independent voice
that could supplement the government’s on important requests.  On these issues, the Report can build momentum for change, complementing
Senator Feinstein’s reform bill, already approved by the Senate Intelligence Committee.  Accepting the importance of those changes does not
require endorsing the Report’s more extreme recommendations, which would compromise security without adding much to liberty – a bad bargain
all around.
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